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Abstract. Password sharing is widely used as a means of delegating
access, but it is open to abuse and relies heavily on trust in the person
being delegated to. We present a protocol for delegating access to web-
sites as a natural extension to the Pico protocol. Through this we explore
the potential characteristics of delegation mechanisms and how they in-
teract. We conclude that security for the delegator against misbehaviour
of the delegatee can only be achieved with the cooperation of the entity
offering the service being delegated. To achieve this in our protocol we
propose configurable cookies that capture delegated permissions.
1 Introduction
Everybody hates passwords. They are insecure in theory and even worse in
practice; complex passwords are slow to use and prone to error. The Pico Project1
[10] aims to provide a secure, privacy-protecting hardware token replacing all of a
user’s passwords while avoiding the need for trusted third parties and eliminating
phishing attacks. To be successful, Pico must give not just the same level of
usability, but also the same level of flexibility as passwords. It must do this even
where the functionality is currently achieved by subverting security mechanisms
to such an extent that the security benefits of passwords are essentially lost. This
is quite a tall order.
A case in point is that of delegation. For most websites there is no formal
approach for delegating access to an account, but users still successfully manage
to do so on a quite routine basis. How do they do this? They share their password
with the person they’re delegating to.
It will be immediately obvious that this provides little-to-no security above
that offered by the delegator’s trust in the person being delegated to. This del-
egatee is granted full permissions to the account, to the extent they could quite
easily lock the rightful owner out by changing the password.
Users aren’t doing this because they lack a basic security understanding.
They do it because they trust the people involved or societal pressures, because
it’s convenient, because they have no alternative, and because it works [9]. Shar-
ing of passwords is even used as an expression of trust [7,8].
The challenge is to provide a more secure approach that users will be willing
to adopt. We ask the question of how Pico, building on top of the incumbent
1 https://mypico.org
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2infrastructures of the Web, can offer similarly simple delegation but without
destroying its security benefits in the process. We will explore this question,
showing that a simple delegation protocol is not only possible, but is in fact a
natural evolution of the existing Pico design. We claim the following contribu-
tions in this paper.
1. A technical solution for delegation offering security, minimal reliance on the
goodwill of the delegatee and using Web technologies for easy deployment
(section 2.1).
2. A taxonomy to explore the space of possible delegation solutions (section 3).
3. A claim that you cannot delegate securely and revocably without introducing
technical changes to the verifier (section 3.1).
4. A discussion about open questions, including how best to deploy evolvable
solutions: better to provide a formal mechanism early that relies on trust, or
a more secure solution requiring changes to website back-ends (section 4)?
2 Pico the Delegation Device
In its broadest terms delegation is an arrangement between three parties: the
delegator user, the delegatee user and the delegated service. We will refer to them
respectively as Rebecca and Eric, accessing the DumpIt cloud storage service.













Fig. 1: Semantic relationship between the actors.
A critical observation for us was that, in its existing form, Pico is already
performing delegation according to the relationship as shown. To see this, con-
sider the standard Pico protocol for logging in to an account on the Web shown
in Figure 2 and which is documented in more detail by Jenkinson et al. [6]. The
process is initiated by Rebecca entering a URL on her browser with the Pico
Lens installed. On receiving the login page, the Lens displays a QR code then
3Fig. 2: The standard Pico protocol.
scanned by the Pico. This provides the Pico with the necessary information to
log in to the DumpIt site.
At this point the real authentication begins. The authentication takes place
between DumpIt and Rebecca’s Pico, with the end result that Rebecca’s Pico has
the digital AuthToken (a session cookie) for accessing the site. But even though
Rebecca’s Pico has authenticated, this is of no use to Rebecca. She doesn’t want
to access the site using her Pico, she wants to access it on a more convenient
device with a decent browser. Hence Rebecca’s Pico delegates the AuthToken to
the browser in step 8 of the protocol.
So Pico is already a delegation device, but with a pool of delegatees restricted
to lenses it’s already paired with. We can generalise this to allow delegation to
other humans by breaking step 8 into two and placing another Pico in the middle.
2.1 Delegation Protocol Using Cookies
The resulting split protocol is shown in Figures 3a and 3b. This allows an autho-
risation token (the session cookie) to be delegated from Rebecca’s Pico – which
has an account with the DumpIt service – to Eric’s Pico, allowing Eric to access
DumpIt as if he were Rebecca (and even if Eric has no account with DumpIt
himself).
The process involves Rebecca passing the AuthToken to Eric that he’s then
able to present to DumpIt for access to the service. As can be seen in Figure
4a, the actual delegation step is initiated when Rebecca selects the option on
her Pico. Her Pico displays a QR code which Eric scans, instigates the transfer
of the AuthToken from Rebeca’s Pico to Eric’s Pico where it can be stored for
later use. The use of a transient QR code is intended to encourage Eric to be
in physical proximity with Rebecca when the transfer takes place, although in
4(a) Delegating an AuthToken.
(b) Using a delegated AuthToken.
Fig. 3: The delegation protocol, slightly simplified for clarity.
and of itself it can’t guarantee this. In the background Rebecca is POST-ing her
credentials to DumpIt, which returns back a session cookie. This session cookie
is the AuthToken passed to Eric.
Some time later Eric will want to make use of the delegated token. Eric can
make use of the existing Pico approach for logging in to websites: he scans a QR
code presented on DumpIt’s login page, providing the Pico with the information
needed to complete the login. As we’ve seen the usual Pico approach would
have Eric’s Pico POST login credentials (username and password) to the website,
which would reply back with a session cookie for access to the site. The Pico
then installs this on the browser. However, the AuthToken held by Eric’s Pico
is already such a session cookie. Rather than POST credentials, Eric’s Pico sends
the AuthToken to the browser, which uses it for access to the site without the
need to log in. Figure 4 illustrates how the process appears to the end user.
5(a) Delegating an AuthToken. (b) Using a delegated AuthToken.
Fig. 4: Delegation in practice.
We have implemented this on top of the existing Android Pico App and
Pico Lens Firefox Plugin. This has provided us some insight into how effective
the approach is, and its prospects for providing improvements in the future. It
has also raised important questions about whether users would make use of the
functionality even if Pico made it available. Is delegation a practical function?
3 Delegation for End Users
To answer this question we believe the social characteristics of delegation are
key. The goal of delegation typically falls in to one of five categories as shown in





















Fig. 5: The five categories of delegation.
Value-sharing involves multiple users all gaining non-exclusive benefit from
a service through delegation of access. Netflix allows the legitimate sharing of
an account for simultaneous streaming (ideal for adults sharing a flat). It sup-
ports multiple profiles but credentials still have to be shared to allow access to
content. Sharing the credentials for simultaneous access multiplies the value of
the account to its users.
6Effort-sharing is similar, but now multiple users are able to share a task
amongst them through access to a service. A reviewer assigned multiple papers
to review through a conference website might delegate some of the reviews to
a colleague by sharing access2. A similar example is that of a corporate social
media account3. The communications team will need access to a single company
account, with the only way of doing so by sharing the credentials between them.
The effort of running the media feed is divided between all of those involved.
Effort-transfer involves the delegation of a specific task from one person
to another and is similar to effort-sharing, but with the addition of exclusivity.
If I want my local computer-shop to health-check my laptop I’ll have to hand
over the admin password. We can’t both work on it simultaneously and ideally
I’d like to give them access only while they’re performing the task on my behalf.
I’ll have to give them admin access too, even though they don’t need to see my
photos and emails.
Value-transfer shifts the process back from activity to consumption again.
Your account credentials represent the key to accessing some value you may
want to ‘gift’ to someone else. For example in the past parents would hand over
cash to their children to buy sweets from the local shop. Now they send them
out with a credit card and PIN [9]. Either way, once the money is spent it can’t
be used again.
Clearly there can be some blurring of boundaries between these categories.
For example a social media account will require effort to maintain, but allows
users to draw benefit from it at the same time.
Self-delegation reverses the role of delegation. Rather than granting access
to others it can be used to restrict access for the owner of the account; useful for
managing risk. For example while travelling abroad you might want to take with
you access to only low-value and essential accounts. You can delegate just the
accounts you need, limiting your exposure in case they are compromised. This
is similar to buying a pre-paid cash card for travel.
One of these categories is not like the others. The first four are all permissive,
whereas the last is restrictive. This is also reflected in how they can be performed.
The first four can all be achieved using passwords, but self-delegation cannot.
For the permissive categories, password sharing is likely to be a simple way
to achieve the objective. It is unlikely to be the safest or most secure way of
doing so, but with an appropriate level of trust most people will accept this
(essentially replacing technical security with personal trust).
It is worth noting that there is another form of delegation that implies an
obligation on the party delegated to, as happens when a task is delegated from
one person to another [5]. In spite of the terminology we use (e.g. effort-sharing
and effort-transfer) we’re only interested in technical enforcement related to
delegation of permissions, not tasks. Although the two may go together (you
2 In practice, most peer-review platforms provide a formal mechanism for delegating
reviews, so sharing an account wouldn’t be necessary.
3 For example Twitter or Instagram.
7Variable Type Values
Usability continuous low – high
Expressiveness/flexibility continuous low – high
Security continuous low – high
Trust required continuous low – high (of E by R)
Accountability of E discrete ∅, E, R, D, ER, ED, RD, all; i.e. P({E,R,D})
Plausible deniability of E discrete full, RD, ED, ER, D, R, E, ∅
Involvement at creation discrete EˆR, ER, ED, EˆRD, ERD
Involvement at operation discrete ED, EDR
Revocable by discrete ∅, R, D, RD
Table 1: Delegation scope. A spanning arc X¯Y implies a physical proximity
constraint, described further in Section 3.1.
may have to delegate some permissions in order for a task to be completed) we
won’t consider how such task obligations might be enforced.
Delegation, then, is a rich space in terms of user motivation and functionality.
In creating an effective delegation process we must encompass this functionality
with our technical protocol, but the design choices we make in achieving this will
also affect other characteristics which are also important, such as usability and
security. Mapping approaches to points in the space of relevant characteristics
can provide us some insight into compromises that might incentivise users to
choose one approach (password sharing?) over another (Pico delegation?).
3.1 Constraints
By definition the process of delegation enforces certain constraints in what any
protocol must involve, such as the fact that Rebecca must be involved in the set
up of the delegation step, and both Eric and DumpIt must be involved in the
use of the delegated privilege.
However there remain several areas that are open to interpretation. Table
1 presents our attempt to define the possible variables that can be used to
categorise different delegation approaches. The table summarises the variables
but requires some explanation in places.
Expressiveness relates to the use of a language to specify the permissions
granted (contrariwise, specifying limits to their use). For example, Rebecca may
want to delegate only a subset of the available functionality of DumpIt, to allow
reading but not writing, or to apply a time restriction on how long the service
can be accessed.
The trust required implies the extent to which Rebecca must trust Eric not to
abuse the delegated permissions. Allowing more precise permissions specification
and support for revocation will reduce the level of trust needed.
The values for accountability list those actors with the potential to account
for Eric’s actions in a provable way. Plausible deniability represents the inverse
8of this. It indicates whether Eric can deny responsibility for an action to a
particular set of other entities.
Whether a party is involved at the creation determines how the process of
delegation takes place (by definition delegation always occurs from Rebecca to
Eric). A spanning arc E˜R implies Eric and Rebecca must be in physical proximity
to perform the delegation (otherwise conducted remotely via the network). Both
the delegatee and delegated service must always be involved when the permission
is used (“involved at operation”). Requiring the delegator to be involved implies
that every action can be permitted or refused in real time.
Finally, revocation implies that Eric’s permissions may be withdrawn without
affecting those of Rebecca.
Ideally a developer could simply select the best for each variable and forge a
new protocol to suit. Unfortunately there are also constraints between them to
prevent them being selected a` la carte. We capture these in the following claim.
Claim 1. The following relationships are intrinsic to the nature of delegation.
1. There is an inverse relationship between expressiveness (supporting a richer
language for expressing rights delegation) and usability.
2. There is a direct relationship between expressiveness and security.
3. There is an inverse relationship between security and trust.
4. Accountability is the precise inverse of plausible deniability. Therefore if Eric
can plausibly deny some act, then he cannot be accountable for it.
5. Revocation implies accountability. If a party can revoke Eric’s permissions
without revoking Rebecca’s, then that party must be able to tell which of
the two is performing an operation.
A number of further relationships would seem to immediately derive from
these, such as that there is an inverse relationship between usability and secu-
rity. For discussion and examples relating trust, security, delegation, plausible
deniability and authentication together, see Christianson’s insightful paper [4].
We also claim the relationship between security, trust and expressiveness to be
of crucial importance, which we express as follows.
Claim 2. For Rebecca to minimise her exposure she must restrict the permissions
entrusted to Eric to just those needed for him to carry out his task.
A more expressive rights language will allow permissions to be expressed more
specifically and therefore reduce trust. Since the permissions are dependent on
the functionality offered by the service, and the gate to this functionality must
also be provided by the service, this immediately leads us to our final claim.
Claim 3. The security-trust balance of delegation can only be achieved if the
verifier offers a means of expressing fine-grained permissions.
We’ll return to this in section 3.3 where we discuss the practical implications
of this in relation to cookies. Since the baseline case in terms of both functionality
and usability is that provided by password sharing, we will consider how this fits
within these constraints in the next section.
93.2 Characteristics using Passwords as Tokens
As we’ve seen, delegation is already perfectly possible just by sharing passwords.
In their seminal paper of 1999, Adams and Sasse recommend shared passwords as
an important way for authentication to match workers’ sense of responsibility:
“Shared work and responsibility require users to perceive that they are using
shared passwords” [1]. They also identify that it can impact security and more
recent advice from GCHQ emphasises this unequivocally: “You should never
allow password sharing between users. Sharing accounts, or even occasional use
by anyone other than the account holder, negates the benefit of authenticating
a specific user.” [3].
In practice, for most websites, sharing of passwords is the only practical
way for an end user to delegate access. If our claims in the previous section
concerning the constraints on delegation are valid, we should be able to place
password sharing into the space and demonstrate how a more formal approach
could move it to a ‘better’ place. We use the variables from Table 1 to summarise
the characteristics as follows.
usability = high, flexibility = min, security = min,
trust = max, accountability = ∅, deniability = full,
creation = E˜R, operation = ED, revocable = ∅.
Our underlying claim is that without a formally defined or approved way to
perform delegation, users will continue to simply share passwords as a means
to achieve it. And yet password sharing is inherently insecure (as indicated by
the security and trust assignments). For delegation to evolve positively, we must
supply sensible protocols for performing delegation that increase security and
decrease trust while having minimal negative impact on usability.
In the next section we will consider our proposed protocol using cookies as
tokens and discuss how it provides a framework that can evolve to support this.
3.3 Characteristics using Cookies
The characteristics depend heavily on the contents of the AuthToken. To take a
common example, a WordPress admin cookie contains the following fields4.
cookie = username | expiration | token | hash.
hash = SHA256 (username | expiration | token,
MD5 (username | passfrag | expiration | token)).
In all cases expiration is the same ASCII string representing the time in Unix





























































Passwords High Min Min Max ∅ Full EˆR ED ∅
Cookies Med Med Med Med RD R,D EˆR ED D
Table 2: Property comparison.
the WordPress database. The passfrag string is a four character fragment of the
base64-encoded hashed password.
The key points to note are that the data – including the expiration time
– are all HMAC-ed and that the cookie includes a per-session random token.
Consequently there’s no way for Eric to extend the expiration time without
invalidating the cookie, and DumpIt can revoke the cookie by disassociating its
database entry for the session token from the user. Finally, although DumpIt
isn’t able to distinguish between normal and delegated sessions, Rebecca can
do so since every AuthToken (each with unique session token field) has to pass
through her Pico. If DumpIt were to record activity against sessions it could, in
collaboration with Rebecca, account for Eric’s activity.
Under this scheme we therefore have the following properties for cookies,
which are also summarised in Table 2 for easy comparison against passwords.
usability = medium, flexibility = medium, security = medium,
trust = medium, accountability = RD, deniability = R,D
creation = E˜R, operation = ED, revocable = D.
This can all be achieved by leveraging the existing site’s cookie mechanisms.
WordPress offers a particularly robust cookie structure; other sites are less thor-
ough, for example relying on the default HTTP cookie expiration fields which
are not cryptographically tied to the cookie (and can therefore be changed).
The only flexibility WordPress offers when generating cookies is whether they
last for two days or two weeks5. This would allow Rebecca some control over
how long Eric is granted access, but doesn’t offer more expressive control over
the admin capabilities delegated to him. Nevertheless this is an improvement on
password delegation. As such we describe this property as medium, although a
different cookie structure could allow greater flexibility (low to high).
5 These values are hardcoded and chosen using the rememberme form value; see https:
//developer.wordpress.org/reference/functions/wp_set_auth_cookie/.
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This is an example of our Claim 3 above. The security is limited by the
expressiveness of the permissions supported by the verifier. In our Pico imple-
mentation the website takes on the role of verifier, and so the website must be
updated to support fine-grained permission and to allow Rebecca to bake config-
urable cookies expressing them to her specification. In theory the website could
choose any rule language for this, but in practice Rebecca specifies the rules
using an interface on her Pico, so some agreed interaction is required.
4 Open Questions
Question 1. Until websites support configurable cookies with more fine-grained
permissions, the Pico implementation can still offer all-or-nothing delegation.
Given the prevalence of password reuse across sites, this represents an improve-
ment on password sharing. Is it therefore appropriate to make this functionality
available even in this sub-optimal form, or better to wait until sites offer the
configurable cookies required for proper security?
Question 2. Our implementation using Pico offers some insight into what is
achievable. But would real people actually use the functionality? A user study
by Bauer et al. [2] found people “are most likely to pick the [delegation] option
they understand the best, even when they know it is not the option they want.”.
Will users take the time to learn about and apply tight delegation rules?
Question 3. In the form of password sharing, delegation is an expression of trust
[8]. If I give you my password I’m not just granting you access, I’m also making a
statement. Is there a way to avoid formal delegation processes becoming a mark
of distrust?
Question 4. Delegation is transitive in our implementation. Therefore an Auth-
Token granted to one user is easily transferred to another. The delegatee doesn’t
even need an account with the delegated service. Can we enforce non-transitive
delegation while still supporting this, and without conflicting with plausible de-
niability?
Question 5. Many sites offer REST-ful APIs intended for delegated access by
trusted apps. Developer tokens or delegated authorisation (e.g. OAuth) are often
used to allow access. Do these provide a better starting point than cookies for
user delegation?
5 Conclusion
Password sharing is widely used as a means of delegating access, so providing
a more formal method seems like an obvious next step. We have described an
approach that is a natural extension to the existing Pico protocol. We found the
most important lever for controlling security to be the expressiveness of the lan-
guage used to describe permissions delegated, and that configurable cookies are
a means for achieving this. Exploring this space has uncovered many questions
that still need to be answered.
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